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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
alleged leave doubt as to whether the action has been brought within
this period, the complaint will withstand demurrer.9 The requirement
that the action be brought within a year is absolute, and no explanation
as to why the institution of the action is delayed is availing.10 "The
lapse of the statutory period not only bars the remedy but destroys the
liability.""
The question remains as to the sufficiency of a complaint which fails
to allege either the date of the death or that the action has been brought
within one year of the death, assuming a cause of action to have been
stated otherwise. Certain language in the Colyar case seems to indicate
that such a complaint would withstand demurrer.12
It is believed that the result of the Colyar case is practical and based
on sound reason. The purpose of this statutory time limit is said to be
to give notice to the defendant so that the evidence may be secured and
preserved.' 3 This notice is given when the plaintiff institutes his action
within the year. It seems unduly technical to require a specific allega-
tion that "this action is brought within one year of the death" when
compliance with the statutory requirement may be shown by reference
to the summons. If it were held that such an allegation is necessary,
then questions would arise as to whether a complaint without this alle-
gation failed to state a cause of action, or merely constituted a defective
statement of a good cause of action. If it were held that such a com-
plaint does not state a cause of action, then an amendment after the
statutory period containing the required allegation would not relate
back to the complaint, and the plaintiff would be defeated on a techni-
cality.' 4 It must be remembered that the purpose of the pleadings is to
frame the issues between the parties for a trial on the merits of the case,
rather than to create a pitfall for the unwary pleader.
MASON P. THOM AS, JR.
Restraint of Trade-Fair Trade Acts-Constitutionality
Manufacturers have long sought ways to protect their good will in
the trade-marks, brands, or names of their commodities. One means
'Wilson v. Chastain, 230 N. C. 390, 53 S. E. 2d 290 (1949) (Complaint al-
leged death ". . . occurred on or about midnight of 21-22 November, 1947, and
which is less than one year next proceeding the institution of this action ..
Summons was served on November 22, 1948).
" Curlee v. Duke Power Co., 205 N. C. 644, 172 S. E. 329 (1934) ; Best v.
Kinston, 106 N. C. 205, 10 S. E. 997 (1890); Taylor v. Cranberry Iron Co., 94
N. C. 525 (1886).
" See Webb v. Eggleston, 228 N. C. 574, 577, 46 S. E. 2d 700, 702 (1948).
2'See 231 N. C. 318, 319, 56 S. E. 2d 647, 648 (1949) ("The plaintiff complied
with the statute when she brought her suit within the prescribed time.").
"3 See Trull v. Seaboard A. L. Ry. Co., 151 N. C. 545, 548, 66 S. E. 586, 587
(1909).
"Davis v. Rhodes, 231 N. C. 71, 56 S. E. 2d 43 (1949) ; Webb v. Eggleston,
228 N. C. 574, 46 S. E. 700 (1948), 27 N. C. L. R~v. 160; Note, Amendinents
Changing the Cause of Action--Lintitations of Actions, 25 N. C. L. REv. 76 (1946).
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employed is the fixing of the prices tlat the retailer is to charge the
consumer, thus preventing that price-cutting by the retailer which is
likely to create in the minds of the public a feeling that the goods are
not worth the prices usually charged'
With the passage of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in 1890, "every
contract, combination ...or conspiracy in restraint of trade or com-
merce among the several states, or with foreign nations" was declared
illegal.2  In Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., the
Supreme Court of the United States held that price-fixing by means of
minimum resale price maintenance contracts was prohibited by the Sher-
man Act. Some state courts reached the same result in cases involving
intrastate commerce, basing their decisions on the contracts being in
restraint of trade and illegal under common law principles or state anti-
trust laws. The majority of the states, however, upheld their legality.
4
Various devices, such as refusing to sell to those who do not maintain
prices, 5 or the constituting of "good faith agencies," 6 were used to cir-
cumvent the Supreme Court ruling in the Dr. Miles case; but they were
not widely used and when attempted were difficult to administer.
7
FTC, 1 RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE 8 (1929).
15 U. S. C. 1 (1946).
220 U. S. 373 (1911); accord, United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252
U. S. 85 (1920).
' Holding the contracts invalid: Mills v. General Ordnance Co., 113 Kan. 479,
215 Pac. 314 (1923); New Century Mfg. Co. v. Scheurer, 45 S. W. 2d 560 (Tex.
App. 1932) ; cf. Texas Standard Cotton Oil Co. v. Adoue, 83 Tex. 650, 19 S. W.
274 (1892).
Holding the contracts valid: D. Ghirardelli & Co. v. Hunsicker, 164 Cal. 355,
128 Pac. 1041 (1912); Grogan v. Chaffee, 156 Cal. 611, 105 Pac. 745 (1909);
Garst v. Charles, 187 Mass. 144, 72 N. E. 839 (1905) ; Garst v. Harris, 177 Mass.
72, 58 N. E. 174 (1900); Clark v. Frank, 17 Mo. App. 602 (1885); Murphy v.
Christian Press Ass'n. Pub. Co., 38 App. Div. 426, 56 N. Y. Supp. 597 (1899);
Fisher Flouring Mills Co. v. Swanson, 76 Wash. 649, 137 Pac. 144 (1913).
' United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U. S. 300 (1919); Harriet Hubbard
Ayer, Inc. v. FTC, 15 F. 2d 274 (2d Cr.), cert. denied, 273 U. S. 759 (1926).
. United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U. S. 476 (1926) (retail dealers
were appointed agents; goods consigned to them with the manufacturer paying
transportation charges and the dealer meeting all other expenses, the dealer to
account periodically, and the merchandise remaining the property of the manu-
facturer until sold by the dealers).
Another method was issuing bona fide licenses containing minimum resale price
clauses as to patented articles. WEIGEL, THE FAIR TRADE Acrs 27 (1938).
' Among the methods held illegal were:
(1) Use by the manufacturer of "cooperative steps," which consisted in ascer-
taining price-cutters by an elaborate and market-wide follow-up system of espion-
age and reporting, and a refusal to sell to the price-cutters until securing their
assurances of price maintenance. FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441
(1922), Resale Price Maintenance, 1 N. C. L. REv. 36; NORwOOD, TRADE PRACTIcE
AND PRICE LAW 134 et seq. (1938).
(2) Issuing "licenses" which were obviously a sham to protect prices on pat-
ented articles. Strauss v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 243 U. S. 490 (1917)
(manufacturer received full compensation before parting with the possession of
the merchandise; no accounting by the retail dealer required; no recordation of
title retention by the manufacturer) ; Boston Store v. American Graphophone Co.,
246 U. S. 8 (1918).
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Several states, with California in 1931 being the first, encouraged
minimum resale price-fixing by enacting what were called Fair Trade
Acts.8 These Acts provide that vertical contracts9 prescribing minimum
resale prices for trade-marked, branded, or named commodities in free
and open competition with commodities of other manufacturers of the
same general class will be legal and enforceable. 10 But in view of the
Sherman Act such contract were legal only in intrastate commerce.
In 1937, Congress passed the Miller-Tydings Amendment" to the
Sherman Act legalizing minimum resale price maintenance contracts in
interstate commerce where such contracts are legal in intrastate com-
merce under the law of the state where the resale is to be made. To
date, Fair Trade Acts have been enacted in all jurisdictions except
Missouri, Texas, Vermont, and the District of Columbia.' 2
Immediately after their inception the constitutionality of the Fair
Trade Acts was questioned on various grounds, including denial of due
process, impairment of the obligation of contract, improper delegation
of legislative power, denial of equal protection of the law, and miscel-
laneous state constitutional provisions.' 3 At firs. several lower state
courts, as well as the Court of Appeals of New York, held them un-
constitutional. 14 Reversing this early trend, the Supreme Court of the
United States in Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers
Corp.1 ruled that these Acts passed by the states were not in contra-
(3) Affixing a notice to a patented article warning that cut-price sales would
constitute a patent infringement. Bauer v. O'Donnell, 229 U. S. 1 (1913).I WEIGEL, THE FAiR Ta AD Acrs 32 et seq. (1938).
9A vertical contract is one between manufacturer and retailer, or between
wholesaler and retailer, etc., as distinguished from a horizontal contract, one be-
tween producers, between wholesalers, or between retailers.
" An analysis of the different provisions of the state Fair Trade Acts is found
in AmERICAN FAIR TRADE COUNCIL, INC., A PRAcTICA GUIDE To FAir TRAD. LAW
10-11 (1948).
% 15 U. S. C. 1 (1946). The Amendment, which expressly excludes horizontal
contracts from its provisions, was passed as a rider to an appropriations bill for
the District of Columbia. President Roosevelt, when signing the bill on August 17,
1937, denounced this practice and expressed fear that the law would lead to in-
creased prices to consumers. 2 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 17058 (1948).
For a discussion of the Amendment's limitations, see NORWOOD, TRADE PRACTICE
AND PRICE LAW 139 et seq. (1938).
11 AmEICAN FAir TRADE Cou-cIL, INC., A PRACTiCAL GUIDE TO FAIR TRADE
LAW 4-5 (1948). The North Carolina statute is N. C. GEN. STAT. §§66-50 through
66-57 (1943), 15 N. C. L. REv. 367 (1937).
By express statute, "fair trade" is illegal in Missouri, Texas, and the District
of Columbia. 2 CCH TRADE REG. REP. ff7098 (1949). Its status in Vermont is
still uncertain. 2 CCH TRADE REG. REP. ff7096 (1949).
See Note, 125 A. L. R. 1339 (1940).
1' Doubleday, Doran & Co. v. Macy & Co., 269 N. Y. 272, 199 N. E. 409 (1936),
overruled by Bourjois Sales Corp. v. Dorfman, 273 N. Y. 167, 7 N. E. 2d 30
(1937).
See WEIGEL, THE FAIR TRADE Acrs 36 et seq. (1938) for the early history of
the Fair Trade Acts and the uncertainty as to their constitutionality.




vention of the Constitution of the United States. Heavily relying on
this affirmation of constitutionality, state courts, including North Caro-
lina, almost uniformly held that the Fair Trade Acts did not violate the
constitution of the state, all earlier decisions to the contrary being re-
versed or overruled.16
Recently, "fair trade" has suffered what has been called its "stiffest
blow" since its inception in California in 1931.17 In Liquor Store, I1W.
v. Continental Distilling Corp.,1 8 the Florida Supreme Court held that
the Florida Fair Trade Act violated the state constitution. The court
stated that although the Florida Act may have been constitutional when
passed in 1939, under present economic conditions it is arbitrary, un-
reasonable, and wholly outside the enacting powers of the state legis-
lature.
The Florida Court should have recognized that whether "fair trade"
be economically wise or unwise, the weighing of all the interests involved
should more properly be a matter for legislative discretion than a sub-
ject for judicial pronouncement.' 9
" Miles Laboratories, Inc. v. Seignious, 30 F. Supp. 549 (E. D. S. C. 1939);
Lilly & Co. v. Saunders, 216 N. C. 163, 4 S. E. 2d 528 (1939); Max Factor &
Co. v. Kunsman, 5 Cal. 2d 446, 55 P. 2d 177 (1936) ; Pyroil Sales Co. v. The Pep
Boys, 5 Cal. 2d 784, 55 P. 2d 194 (1936); Burroughs Welcome & Co. v. John-
son Wholesale Perfume Co., 128 Conn. 596, 24 A. 2d 841 (1942); Seagram-Dis-
tillers Corp. v. Old Dearborn Distributing Co., 363 Ill. 610, 2 N. E. 2d 940 (1936);
International Cellucotton Products v. Kraus Co., 200 La. 959, 9 So. 2d 303 (1942);
Goldsmith v. Mead Johnson & Co., 176 Md. 682, 7 A. 2d 176 (1939) ; Weco Prod-
ucts Co. v. Sam's Cut Rate, Inc., 296 Mich. 190, 295 N. W. 611 (1941) ; Johnson
& Johnson v. Weissbard Brothers, 121 N. J. Eq. 585, 191 Atl. 873 (1937); Bour-
jois Sales Corp. v. Dorfman, 273 N. Y. 167, 7 N. E. 2d 30 (1937), overruling
Doubleday, Doran & Co. v. Macy & Co., 269 N. Y. 272, 199 N. E. 409 (1936);
Broxmeyer v. Polikoff, 39 Pa. D. & C. 224 (1940); Welch Grape Juice Co. v.
Frankfort Grocery Co., 36 Pa. D. & C. 653 (1939); Miles Laboratories, Inc. v.
Owl Drug Co., 67 S. D. 523, 295 N. W. 292 (1940); Sears v. Western Thrift
Stores of Olympia, Inc., 10 Wash. 2d 372, 116 P. 2d 756 (1941) ; Weco Products
Co. v. Reed Drug Co., 225 Wis. 474, 274 N. W. 426 (1937) (except a provision
exempting non-profit cooperatives).
The Florida Supreme Court, in Bristol Myers Co. v. Webb's Cut Rate Drug
Co., 137 Fla. 508, 188 So. 91 (1939), declared the Florida Fair Trade Act un-
constitutional since the title did not show that the Act applied to non-signers. This
defect was soon remedied by legislative action.
17 Business Week, April 23, 1949, p. 19.
1840 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1949).
20 In an attempt to get around the court's decision, the 1949 Florida legislature
passed a new Fair Trade Act, SE,. BILL No. 592, Laws of 1949, effective June 1,
1949, with two notable changes: (1) A "finding of fact' by the legislature that
"fair trade" best serves the interests and general welfare of the state of Florida
(To this the court would probably reply, ". . . the mere designation of an act as
best serving [the interests and general welfare of the state] does not preclude
judicial appraisal, and courts of equity will not be misled by mere devices or baffled
by mere forms, but they will disregard names and penetrate disguises of form to
discover the substance of an act or transaction." Liquor Stores, Inc. v. Conti-
nental Distilling Corp., 40 So. 2d 371, 385 (Fla. 1949)), and (2) the Attorney-
General is empowered "to bring actions to restrain performance of any fair-trade
contracts that prevent competition in the manufacture, making, transportation, sale,
or purchase of commodities of the same general class." Business Week, June 18,
1949, p. 72; 63 HARv. L. REv. 546 (1950).
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Indeed, it was not even necessary for the Florida court to consider
the question of constitutionality. By the court's own admission, the
contracts under consideration could have been declared invalid since
there was not that free and open competition which the Miller-Tydings
Amendment and the Florida Fair Trade Act require, inasmuch as the
plaintiff was a subsidiary of a corporation which with four others con-
trolled from eighty to ninety per cent of the supply of alcoholic liquors
in the United States.20 Nevertheless, contrary to the usual judicial
procedure, the court went out of its way to declare the Act unconstitu-
tional.
Soon after the decision of the Florida Supreme Court, a Mississippi
lower court, faced with questions similar to those posed before the
Florida Court, decided that the Fair Trade Act of that state was uncon-
stitutional.21
In states where the power of the legislature to pass Fair Trade Acts
has been affirmed, courts have recently been critical of the manner in
which the legislature has undertaken to exercise this power. The Illi-
nois court has ruled that the Mandatory Fair Trade Act, requiring all
liquor sold in Illinois to be "fair-traded" and a list of such prices filed
with the state liquor-regulatory body, is unconstitutional since it is not
complete in itself but refers to the Fair Trade Act without explaining
what constitutes "fair trade."22 New York has held that the legislature
unduly delegated its powers when it created a commission with authority
to decide for itself whether or not liquor should be "fair-traded," and
at what prices it should be sold.23
Oklahoma has taken the same critical attitude. Where the "fair
trade" price allowed the retailer a profit of about 375%, resale at that
price was ruled unenforceable as being an arbitrarily and capriciously
fixed price which allowed an unreasonable margin of profit.24 If the
reasoning of the Oklahoma court is followed, courts may be able to
eliminate some of the evils of high prices resulting from "fair trade"
without the necessity of declaring the Fair Trade Act itself unconsti-
tutional.
There has never been a direct ruling on the constitutionality of the
Miller-Tydings Amendment, but anti-fair traders think the present
Supreme Court would declare that it contravenes the United States
Constitution.25 About thirty states have yet to rule on the constitu-
"Liquor Stores, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 40 So. 2d 371, 376 (Fla.
1949)." Shaeffer Pen Co. v. Barret, 4 CCH TRADE, REG. REP. 162,399 (Miss. 1949).
-2 Illinois Liquor Control Commission v. Chicago's Last Chance Liquor Store,
Inc., 88 N. E. 2d 15 (Ill. 1949).2 Levine v. O'Connell, 88 N. Y. S. 2d 672 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
"Julius Schmid, Inc. v. McKay, 4 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 162,509 (Okla. 1949).
-'Business Week, April 23, 1949, p. 19, at 20.
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tionality of their Fair Trade Acts.2 6  The Anti-Trust Division of the
Department of Justice27 and the Federal Trade Commission28 are at
present leading an attack in Congress on the Miller-Tydings Amend-
ment;20 and bills have been introduced in at least three state legislatures
to repeal or emasculate the Fair Trade Act of that state.30 If either
attack on the federal law should prove successful, then minimum resale
price maintenance contracts would be illegal in interstate commerce
under the provisions of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.3 1 In the event
of a successful attack on a state law, resale price maintenance contracts
in that state would probably be illegal in intrastate commerce;32 in
which case the Miller-Tydings Amendment, even if retained, makes
them illegal in interstate commerce if the resale is to take place in a state
where the contracts are not valid.
Among the chief grounds of attack on "fair trade" in the legislatures
will be the assertions that it tends to eliminate competition,33 that the
property rights of the retailer in the goods are encroached upon,34 and
" See note 16 supra. Only three out of the six judges who held the Fair Trade
Act of North Carolina constitutional in Lilly & Co. v. Saunders, 216 N. C. 163, 4
S. E. 2d 528 (1939) are still on the bench. The lone dissenter, J. Barnhill, is still
on the court.
" Herbert A. Bergson, head of the Anti-Trust Division of the Dept. of Justice,
has said, "It [the Miller-Tydings Amendment] creates a disturbing conflict be-
tween legal price fixing and the general price fixing inhibitions of the Sherman
Act." Shoenfeld, Congress Squares Off for a Scrap on Fair Trade Repeal, 62
SALES MANAGEMENT, p. 81, 83 (June 1, 1949). See TNEC, INVESTIGATION OF
CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIC POWER, FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 232
et seq. (1941), attacking the manner in which the enactment of the Miller-Tydings
Amendment and the state Fair Trade Acts was secured, and asserting that many
"fair trade" contracts do not comply with one or both of those laws.
"8 "The Miller-Tydings Amendment legalizes contracts whose object is to re-
quire all dealers to sell at not less than the resale price stipulated by contract
without reference to their individual selling costs or selling policies. The Com-
mission believes that the consumer is not only entitled to competition between rival
products but to competition between dealers handling the same branded product."
REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ON RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE,
LXIV (1945).
"XXXIX Fortune, Jan. 1949, p. 70 Rep. O'Toole (D., N. Y.) has introduced
a bill to repeal the Amendment, and Rep. Celler (D., N. Y.) has proposed an
investigation of it by the House Judiciary Committee. Business Week, April 23,
1949, p. 19. Rep. Klein (D., N. Y.), however, has introduced a bill to validate
minimum price agreements in the District of Columbia. Shoenfeld, Congress
Squares Off for a Scrap on Fair Trade Repeal, 62 SALES MANAGEMENT 81 (June 1,
1949).
"0 Business Week, April 23, 1949, p. 19; Shoenfeld, Congress Squares Off for a
Scrap on Fair Trade Repeal, 62 SALES MANAGEMENT 81 (June 1, 1949).
As an indication of the trend in thought, the North Carolina House of Repre-
sentatives rejected by a 41-40 vote a measure to put into effect in North Carolina
the Unfair Practices Act, now law in about thirty states, which would hat e made
it illegal for merchants to sell goods at less than cost in order to discourage or
destroy competition. News and Observer, April 20, 1949, p. 14, col. 3.
31 See OPPENHEIM, CASES ON FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST LAwS 383-387 (1948).
83 See note 4 supra.
"Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373, 400
(1911).
" Liquor Store, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Co., 40 So. 2d 371, 375 (Fla.
1949).
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that higher prices result from these contracts.3 5 Leading counter-argu-
ments will be that this method is the only effective way to protect the
good will of the manufacturer,3 6 that the dealer takes the goods with
the contract attached,3 7 and that the prices on non-fair-traded goods
have risen more sharply than those on fair-traded commodities.3 8
Future litigation and legislative controversy over resale price main-
tenance appear to be a certainty. Whether "fair trade" be economically
wise or unwise, the trend shows that it is in for some minute examina-
tion by the courts and legislative bodies.
KIRBY SULLIVAN.
Trial Practice-Prosecutor's Comments-Arguing Possibility of
Parole or Pardon as Reason for Withholding Recommendation
for Life Imprisonment
"Gentlemen, . . . With our system in Georgia, a man is entitled to
parole or pardon after seven years, and when his application is put in
all the judges or interested parties are usually out of office and no one
recalls the facts in the crime. If this jury sentenced this defendant to
life imprisonment and he should be given his release on parole in seven
"XXXIX Fortune, April 1949, p. 75; XXXIX Fortune, Jan. 1949, p. 85;
Shoenfeld, Congress Squares Off for a Scrap on Fair Trade Repeal, 62 SALES
MANAGEMENT 81 (June 1, 1949). -
Other arguments of those opposed to "fair trade' are:
(1) As the "fair trade" fields become more crowded there will tend to be an
elimination of the small retailer since the old-timers will try to restrict the number
of new dealers. XXXIX Fortune, April 1949, p. 75, 76. This is claimed to have
already happened to some extent in England. XXXIX Fortune, Jan. 1949, p. 70,
166.
(2) The manufacturer can adequately protect his good will by refusing to sell
to those who refuse to comply with a resale price agreement. Liquor Store, Inc.
v. Continental Distilling Corp., 40 So. 2d 371, 388 (Fla. 1949).
(3) Chain stores reap unnecessarily juicy profits by reason of less expense in
marketing "fair-traded" goods, and they often sell similar products under their
own brand or trade name at cheaper prices. XXXIX Fortune, April 1949, p. 75;
TNEC INVESTIGATION OF CONCENTRATION OF EcONOMIC POWER, FINAL REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 232, 234-5 (1941).
" Newcomb, In Defense of Fair Trade, 13 JOURNAL OF MARKETING 84, 85
(Juy 1948).
" Callman, "Fair Trade" and Anti-Trust Law, 10 U. oF PiTT. L. REY. 443, 462
(1949).
" Griffiths, Further Comments on) Fair Trade, 13 JOURNAL OF MARKETING 85
(July 1948).
Other arguments urged in support of "fair trade" are:
(1) The "fair trade" system has been of tremendous benefit to a number of
industries. Behoteguy, Resale Price Maintenance in the Tire Industry, 13 JOURNAL
OF MARKETING 315, 319 (Jan. 1949).
(2) "Fair trade" protects the consumer from deceptive price-cutting tactics.
AMERICAN FAIR TRADE COUNCIL, INC., A PRACTIcAL GUIDE TO FAIR TRADE LAWS
34 (1948).
(3) "Fair trade" is no barrier to competition between rival articles. Callman,
"Fair Trade" and Anti-Trust Law, 10 U. OF PITT. L. REv. 443, 452 (1949).
(4) In those states allowing fixed prices, the manufacturer may hold down
prices.
[Vol. 28
